Question Two. Whether the Form of the Eucharist is what is set down in the Canon of the Mass

52. To proceed to the second question [n.14], argument is made that what is set down in the canon of the mass is not the precise consecration of the Eucharist.

53. First, because the pronoun ‘this’ points either to the substance of the bread or to its accidents, and in both ways the proposition is false. Either it points to the body of Christ and then the proposition does nothing, as does neither the proposition ‘my body is my body’; for no proposition does anything or works anything that would be true whether any action or operation is not posited or equally whether one is posited, of which sort is ‘my body is my body’. Again, the pronoun ‘this’ is demonstrative for the moment for which it is spoken; but in that moment the body of Christ is not there; so in that case it is demonstrative of the bread or the accidents. But then the proposition is false, because neither the bread nor the accidents are the body of Christ. But false speech cannot be the form in a sacrament of truth;     therefore etc     .

54. Again, it is not licit to interpose anything as a matter of rule in the form of the sacrament handed on by Christ (by ‘as a matter of rule’ I mean a slight casual interruption, as was spoken about in the definition of baptism [IV d.3 nn.77-78]); but the conjunction ‘for’ is here interposed as a matter of rule, and it is not handed on by Christ, as is plain from the Gospels.

55. Again, just as the pronoun ‘I’ signifies the first person, so the pronoun ‘my’ signifies the possessive of the first person. Therefore just as someone who says ‘I’ is speaking of himself, so someone who says ‘my’ is pointing to something he possesses; therefore when the priest says ‘my’ he is pointing to the thing’s being his own, that is, the priest’s.

56. Again, about the form of consecration of the blood, argument is made that it is not the form we use, because it is not found handed on by Christ - for no Evangelists sets down those words.

57. Again, as few words seem to sufficient for the consecration of the blood as for that of the bread;     therefore , since the consecration of the body consists of four words, it seems it should be similar also for the consecration of the blood, that is, that the following words should suffice, namely ‘this is my blood’; therefore the rest are superfluous.

58. On the contrary:

In Gregory IX, Decretals, Innocent III says that the form of the words, as it is written in the Canon, was received from Christ by the Apostles and from the Apostles by their successors; therefore etc     .

I. To the Question

59. My reply.

Here three things must be looked at: first whether the Eucharist has a single form; second which form; third what it signifies.

A. Whether the Eucharist has a Single Form

60. The first point is plain from the solution to the preceding question [nn.35-36], because no words are the form of the Eucharist nor belong to its essence, but some words are the form of the consecration of the Eucharist.

61. And by understanding the form in this way (because it is thus put in the question what the form of consecration is), I say that just as this sacrament is one by oneness of integrity and not indivisibility [ibid.] (for it includes in itself two partial signs, which each first signify their own two proper and proximate things, namely body and blood, and two remote things, namely spiritual eating and drinking), so too is this sacrament one consecration by oneness of integrity and yet two partial consecrations. For just as some things are one, so is their beginning one, and just as some things are several, so are their beginnings several; and just as the consecration is several, so is its beginning several. The consecration, therefore, is several partial consecrations, yet one consecration by oneness of integrity

62. Now the distinction between these partial forms is clear, because each of them is efficacious without the other. The fact is manifest; for otherwise the faithful, when adoring the body of Christ before the consecration of the blood, would be idolaters (which is false).

B. What the Form of the Eucharist is

1. About the Words for the Consecration of the Body

63. About the second point [n.59] I say the words of consecration of the body of Christ are four: the pronoun ‘this’, the verb ‘is’ and, as the predicate in apposition, ‘my body’.

64. “The conjunction ‘for’ is not of the essence of the form,” according to one doctor [Richard of Middleton, Sent. IV d.8 3 q.1], “but is put to designate the ordering of the consecration of the sacrament to the use of the sacrament.” This is plain from the words, “Take, this is my body etc.”, as if one were to say, “Since the consecration is of this sort, use thus the thing consecrated.”

65. But another reason can be given, namely that the ‘for’ is put to show that the words that belong to the form are not spoken without what precedes.

66. But there is here a doubt, whether the priest would complete the sacrament by means of these four words [n.63] when omitting the preceding words.

67. One statement [Richard of Middleton] is that he would, because the four words are the form and the others are for reverence or for preceding with a prayer.

68. But one can, against this, argue that the sacramental words, by the force of the words, should signify what is done there by the force of the sacrament; but the existence of the true body of Christ is effected there by the force of this kind of consecration; therefore the words should adequately signify this by their own force, namely that the body of Christ is contained there. But the words “This is my body,” when spoken without the preceding ones do not signify this absolutely, because the ‘my’ signifies that it refers to the person of the speaker, for although the minister could be intending to speak in the person of Christ, yet the thing signified by the words would, for this reason, not be that the word ‘my’ would denote the body of Christ but that it would denote the body of the speaker. It would be just as if I were to begin speaking thus: “my doctrine is not mine;” for although I would be intending to speak in the person of Christ, yet one would not get from the force of the words that this is the doctrine of Christ, but rather that it is the doctrine of him who is speaking. It is like when the angel said in the person of God, “I am the God of Abraham” [Exodus 3.2-6]; the proposition was not false in the sense in which it was spoken, yet the proper significance of this sentence is that the ‘I’ would be standing for the person of God.

69. This is also confirmed by the words of Ambrose (On the Sacraments IV ch.4 n.17, ch.5 n.21 [Decretum p.3 d.2 ch.55]), “The words of Christ alter the creature,” and there follows, “With what words is the consecration done? Hear what the words are: ‘Take and eat all of you of this, for this is my body’,” where Ambrose seems to conjoin the preceding words, namely ‘Take.’, as if they were words of consecration. But this is not to be understood as if they essentially pertained to the necessity of the consecration, but as if they were necessarily to be placed first; and not only these words but several others that precede in the canon. And therefrom can be got that, by the force of the words, ‘this is my body’ are said in the person of Christ.

70. Hence not without cause did the Church thus connect the whole canon of the mass, because from the place “Having communion with.” up to the place “Humbly we pray thee, almighty God.” there is no section that is not connected with the preceding, either by a copulative conjunction (as “We therefore beseech thee.this oblation” and the like), or by an indefinite pronoun (as is plain from the words “Which oblation do thou, O God.,” and “Who the day before he suffered...” and, after the consecration, “Deign to regard them.”) or by relation (as “In like manner.”).

71. There will, as to this article, be a general discussion about what things will have to be observed, together with other doubts. [nn.89-91].

2. About the Words of Consecration of the Blood

a. Two Doubts and their Solution

72. About the words of consecration of the blood there is more doubt, because there are two things for doubt:

The first is that none of the Evangelists recites the form that we use;     therefore , based on the Gospel, the form does not seem certain. The Greeks too use another form saying, “This is my blood of the New Testament, which is shed for you and for many for the remission of sins etc     .;” and consequently our form is not exact.

73. I reply that I do not doubt but that our form is certain, according to the authority of Innocent [n.58], because many things have been handed on to the Church by the Apostles that, however, are not thus written in the Gospels.

74. Nor is what is said about the Gospels a problem, because the Evangelists intended to narrate what was done, and not to hand on the form of consecrating.

75. But even about the form of the Greeks the Church does not say that they do not perform the sacrament.

76. Hence some say that their form and ours (and whatever is written in the Gospels) is sufficient for consecration, but in the Roman Church the form that we use is a necessity for the minister.

77. The second doubt is whether to the form we use belong all the words from the place “In like manner.” up to “Wherefore, Lord, we.mindful.”

78. But it is commonly held that the words “Do this in memory of me” do not belong to the form.

79. The proof is shown in this way, that “Take.this [in memory of me]” does not more relate to the blood than the body, for Christ commanded that the consecration of the body as of the blood be done in memory of him; therefore if these words belong to the consecration of the blood, by equal reason they belong to that of the body as well, and consequently, when the host is elevated, the body of Christ has still not been consecrated and so it is idolatry (which is not to be said).

80. The point is also plain because the precept about the use of consecration is not the form of the consecration; but this precept, when “Do this in memory of me” is said, is about the use of the consecration, as the words show;     therefore etc     .

81. Again, by these words Christ conferred on the Apostles the power of performing the sacrament; for he ordained them priests; but the conferring of power to consecrate is not done by words pertaining to consecration, because the words of consecration have regard to the matter that is consecrated, or to the term for which it is consecrated; but the words conferring power have regard to the power they confer and to him on whom it is conferred.

b. Whether all the Words belong to the Form of Consecration of the Blood

82. On the supposition that the above is certain, do all the words (up to “Do this...”) belong to the form of the consecration of the blood?

α. Opinion of Others and its Rejection

83. One assertion [Alexander of Hales, Aquinas] is that they do.

First about the words “which is shed for you.”, because the relative pronoun involves what precedes and is part of a single whole speaking.

84. Likewise they say this much more about the words “of the New and eternal Testament,” because this is a sort of specification of what precedes, when it is said “chalice of my blood, of the New and eternal....”

85. Now all these words, which seem to belong to a single speech, seem to belong to a single form; therefore both the words “of the New and.,” which it is certain belong to a single speech, and the words “which is shed for you.,” which, because of what they imply, seem to belong to the same speech, all belong to the form of the consecration of the blood.

86. But these arguments are not probative:

For it is possible that many things are added in the words of consecration and that the whole consecration would be obtained even if these many things were not expressed (just as Christ could have said, “This is my body, assumed from a Virgin and hung upon the cross,” as he said of the blood “which is shed for you.”); and then although the words would, by reason of devotion, need to be said, yet they would not have been strictly necessary for the form, even if they belonged to the same speech.

87. Also the words “which is shed for you” seem to be much less the same assertion as the preceding than do the words “of the New and eternal.”, because the words could be understood in the sense of composition and division (just as the sophism ‘every man who is other than Socrates is running’ is distinguished) - even if the implication, in the sense of composition, is part of the same assertion. And thus could it be understood in the matter at hand, so that before the ‘which is shed for you’ the complete statement would not be understood, or that by the ‘which is shed for you’ a statement added on jointly to the preceding in the sense of division would begin, and the ‘which’ would, following Priscian [Grammatical Instruction XVII 4 nn.27-32], be expounded by ‘and it’.‘Every man who is other than Socrates is running’ can be understood, in the sense of composition, to mean that among the men Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Theophrastus, all are running save the man Socrates; or it could be understood, in the sense of division, to mean that all men are other than Socrates, so that Socrates is not a man. In the context of the canon of the mass the words ‘which is shed for you’, if taken in the sense of composition would mean ‘my blood, that is, the blood which is shed for you’. In the sense of division, it would mean, ‘my blood, and it is shed for you’. ¹

88. Likewise too the words “of the New Testament” are commonly understood, in accord with the saints, as a confirmation of the remark in which what is implied by “chalice of my blood” is understood - “chalice of my blood, I say, which blood confirms the New and eternal Testament etc.”

β. Scotus’ own Opinion

89. About this article I say in brief that it has not altogether been handed down to us with certitude whether the words after ‘of my blood’ belong to the form of the consecration of the blood or to some of the other words that continue up to “Do this etc.” So it is dangerous to be assertive of that about which there is no sufficient authority. But it is not dangerous to be ignorant, for the ignorance seems invincible.

90. Herefrom follows a disproof of something said by a less discrete doctor [Richard of Middleton], that it is necessary in the case of any sacrament to know precisely what are the words belonging to the form in order for anyone to confer the sacrament. For this is manifestly false, not only in the issue at hand, but also in baptism and in penance and in the sacrament of Orders. For perhaps there is no one who knows for certain - neither a bishop nor an ordained minister - what words belong precisely to ordination to the priesthood, and yet one must not say that no one in the Church has been ordained to the priesthood.

91. What then is my advice?

I say that when a priest intends to do what the Church does and reads distinctly the words of the canon from beginning to end, he does truly perform the sacrament; nor is it safe for anyone, who reckons himself especially skilled, to rely on his knowledge and say “I wish to use the precise words for the consecration of the blood;” but simplicity is more secure, “I wish to speak the words with the intention with which Christ instituted that they be spoken, so that what by Christ’s institution belongs to the form I say as belonging to the form, and what by his institution belongs to reverence, I say for reverence.”

92. But what if the priest happens to hesitate before all the words are spoken; is the blood to be held truly consecrated?

I say here what was said in a case set down above [n.66], which is that if a priest begins to speak as follows, “this is my body” and does not state all the aforesaid words in their totality, I say that in all such cases the sacrament is not to be adored save under the condition ‘if it is truly consecrated’.

93. Are the words to be repeated then?

I say not absolutely.

94. But surely under a condition?

I say that there is not here the same sort of necessity as in baptism, because in baptism, when there is doubt about the baptizing, there is doubt about salvation; and so it is necessary sometimes to give baptism under a condition. But if here, in either of the cases mentioned [n.92], there is probable doubt whether the consecration is complete, no danger of salvation threatens if no repetition is made, whether absolutely or under a condition.

95. What then? Is the matter to be always or perpetually preserved?

I say no, because it would putrefy; but, after the communion during mass, the priest can receive the matter under some such conditional intention: “if this is consecrated I receive it as consecrated; if not, not, but I receive it as something about which there is uncertainty.” Nor can there be danger here, because he is fasting before receiving the cleansing wine. And if it is not blood that he receives, he yet does no irreverence to the body and blood already received, because we too after receiving the blood at once perceive pure [unconsecrated] wine [left] on the altar.

C. What the Form of the Eucharist Signifies

1. The Opinion of Peter of Poitiers and its Rejection

96. About the third point [n.59] the assertion is made [Peter of Poitiers] that “the priest speaks the words quasi-materially,” because “he recites them as they were said by Christ, as is plain from the text that precedes it in the canon.” But when Christ said those words he did not transubstantiate the bread into his body by them, because from the words of the canon it seems that “he made a blessing” is there as a preface. Hence it is asserted that he completed the consecration through the preceding benediction, and not through the following words ‘this is my body’.

97. Innocent III agrees with this On the Holy Mystery of the Altar IV chs.6, 17.

98. On the contrary:

Either Christ performed the sacrament without words, which is not likely, or with words, and then either with these words or with others. Not with others than those aforesaid, because it is not probable that the author and the ministers (to whom he committed the form) used different forms. If he used the same words the difficulty remains about the signification of the utterance Christ spoke last, “This is my body etc.” 99. Again, if Christ were now a wayfarer he could pronounce the words and perform the sacrament, and the difficulty remains as before.

2. The Opinion of Richard of Middleton and its Rejection

100. There is another opinion [Richard of Middleton], that a noun signifies without time and so can stand for a supposit of any time; and it cannot be restricted by the time co-signified by the verb that signifies the completed proposition. For the verb is remote from the understanding of the noun, and nothing is contracted by something that is remote from it (just as ‘man’ is not contracted when ‘man is white’ is said, though it is contracted when ‘this white man runs’ is said). So in like manner, when a pronoun is put in place of a proper name and signifies without time, it can signify or point to something without time, because ‘this’ signifies that it points to something for all time. And so the pronoun ‘this’ can, under a disjunction, point to what is contained under the species now or to what will be contained under them in a moment; so that, for the intellect, there is a pointing to what is directly pointed to and, for the senses, a pointing to what is indirectly pointed to [cf. IV d.2 n.19]; and what is directly pointed to is either something now present or something that will be present in the next moment, and what is pointed to for the senses is ‘under these species’. And the above disjunctive is true, because one or other part is true. And this as concerns the intellect, to which namely the divine virtue assents, when such words [sc. ‘this is my body’] are said, bringing about, at the final moment, what is signified.

101. Against this: although the pronoun ‘this’ need not point to anything for a determinate time, yet as he [Richard] himself argues, the signification of an utterance is constituted from the signification of the parts; but the parts signify when they are uttered; therefore, even according to him one must say that the word ‘this’, when uttered, signifies that which it then points to. But it does not seem that it can then point to something that is not then contained under the species, because one could in this way say ‘this fire is water’ or ‘this body is water’, when speaking of fire that is at once to be converted into water; and one could do such pointing for the senses indirectly and for the intellect directly, and do so by pointing to the body that is now or will be in the next moment. But it does not seem reasonable to say of air, when immediately changing it, that ‘this body is fire’; for the statement ‘this body is air’ is simply true, and ‘fire’ and ‘air’ are not said of the same thing at the same time.

102. Again, if the parts of an utterance signify when they are uttered, and if from the things signified by the parts thus taken the thing is signified by the whole utterance according to how that utterance takes the parts, then one must say that the ‘is’, when uttered, posits what it signifies for the present moment that it signifiess; but the subject of the first part of the disjunction [n.100] is not taken for any time that is the same as that which is imported by the copula ‘is’ [sc. ‘this’ is taken for the bread now, and ‘is my body’ is taken for the body in the next moment]. Therefore, the whole signification of the utterance does not refer to any same thing or to the same instant.

103. Again, a disjunctive does not posit either disjunct determinately, but a fallacy of the consequent follows; so if ‘this’ stands here disjunctively [sc. either for bread or for Christ’s body], it does not, in respect to the predicate, posit one disjunct (namely what will be under the species in the next moment), just as it does not posit the other disjunct either (namely what is now under the species). And what is brought about by the utterance is, according to them [Richard and his followers, n.100], only that the disjunction is true. Therefore, the effect of the disjunction is no more that what will immediately be under the species is the body of Christ than that what is now under them is so.

3. A Possible Solution Consisting of Thirteen Main Conclusions

104. [First conclusion] - Therefore one can say differently, and let this conclusion be the first, that the conception that is caused by the spoken utterance is only grasped in the last moment of the uttering of the words.

105. The proof is that a conception of all the parts of the utterance cannot be had before that point; for a conception of the whole utterance is not had without the conception of the parts.

106. There is confirmation by way of likeness, because a concept formed by an expression is not had before the final moment of uttering the expression; therefore similarly about uttering a complete sentence. And the reason for the likeness is that, just as the parts of an expression do not signify the simple concept that the expression signifies, so the expression does not signify any complex concept that the whole uttered sentence signifies. But the difference is that a part of a sentence does signify some concept, but a part of an expression does not signify any simple concept. However, the only difference relevant there to the matter at issue is that, in both cases, the whole conception is not had save at the end of everything uttered [n.105].

107. If objection is made that therefore an utterance causes a concept when it does not exist because, when it has been completely uttered, nothing of it exists - I reply: it is plain that the objection is not cogent, because the same could be argued about the concept imported by an expression.

108. Therefore I say that when a concept comes to be in the intellect in the moment after the utterance of a sentence or expression, it does not come to be through the uttering, because the uttering does not exist, as was said, but it comes to be at the end of the uttering of any expression through something caused in imagination by the expression, because of which (while it was being uttered) the intellect causes in itself some concept of the expression. Or more to the matter at hand, through things left behind by the individual expressions while they were being uttered, the intellect in the final moment brings them together and causes an understanding or conception of the whole. And therefore did I speak of the concept that is caused by the utterance [n.104], because otherwise it could be from the signified concept that is not caused by the utterance (as a concept in the speaker which he intends to express by his utterance).

109. And if it is argued against this conclusion that the thing signified by the whole utterance arises from the things signified by the parts and that the parts signify when they are uttered - I reply that the signification is not the formal reason of causing the concept in the hearer but is a certain preceding disposition, upon which there follows, by the intellect’s act of combining, a causing of the whole concept out of the concepts caused by the parts [n.108].

110. [Second conclusion] - The second conclusion is that it is not necessary that, in the moment of uttering or in time, the concept is caused in the hearer by the uttered words and that the truth of this concept is understood without uniting the terms. For if I say, ‘God created the world’, the concept of this assertion is caused in the final moment [sc. of the uttering], but the truth of it, or the uniting of the terms, is understood to be for the first moment of time [sc. for God created the world ‘in the beginning’]. So it is not the same to say ‘in which moment’ and ‘for which moment’ the whole statement is conceived; for it is conceived in the last moment of the completed assertion, and it is also conceived for the moment when the terms are indicated as being united in the intellect or outside in the thing [sc. ‘God created the world’ is understood in the final moment of the uttering of the assertion, but it is understood to be for, or about, the beginning of all time].

111. [Third conclusion] - The third conclusion is that the terms are denoted as being united for that moment, and consequently that there is truth in the assertion which is co-signified by the verb that joins the terms together; for there is nothing else in the proposition that would signify the time to which the union of the terms (from the understanding of the proposition) is referred.

112. [Fourth conclusion] - The fourth conclusion is that a verb of any time can signify a time or a moment; otherwise one could not express a concept about the present, past, or future union of the terms.

113. For if one could not co-signify a past moment when the verb is in the past tense, or a present one when it is in the present tense, or a future one when it is in the future tense, no proposition in which is expressed a union of terms would be true, and this union of terms could only be in a moment (for example, ‘this soul was created’ would not be true, nor ‘this soul is being created’ nor ‘this soul will be created’).

114. Also, if the present time could not be co-signified if the verb is present, nor past time if the verb is past nor future time if the verb is future, no proposition would be true whose terms cannot be united except for a time (and then ‘the heaven was in motion’ would not be true, nor ‘the heaven is in motion’ nor ‘the heaven will be in motion’).

115. In continuation of this conclusion I say that the statement ‘a verb cosignifies a moment or time properly speaking’ (whether speaking of a present or past or future verb) belongs to the multiplicity of the third mode of equivocation, which is according to things co-signified by an expression that has the same meaning [Peter of Spain, Tractatus tr.7 nn.29-39, 28]. But the unitings of the terms for a moment or a time are not causes of the truth of such a proposition, because there is no single mode that is included indifferently in the two modes. And so they would have to have one common concept when they are causes of truth in what they co-signify or signify.

116. [Fifth conclusion] - The fifth conclusion, according to one of the modes of speaking, is that a verb, if it is present tense and signifies a moment, signifies the moment of the complete uttering of the whole assertion, because the union and concept of the terms or of the whole assertion is understood for the whole time of the uttering, and the whole concept is understood for the final moment. But if the verb is present tense and cosignifies time, it co-signifies the time of its uttering, whether the whole of it or a part; and accordingly, if in the final moment of the uttering of a verb fire were generated, this proposition would be true ‘fire is generated’. Now this is similar to ‘the heaven is in motion’ or ‘I am running’, if in the whole time of the uttering of it or in any part, at least a large part, the terms are united. And accordingly these propositions will never be true ‘I am drinking’ or ‘I am sleeping’ and the like, because they cannot be true as they cosignify the moment, because the act cannot be in a moment - not even if it co-signifies time, because the terms are not united for the whole time of the uttering of the assertion nor for a part of it.

117. Therefore the proposition will always be false.

118. [Sixth conclusion] - Accordingly a sixth conclusion would be posited, that in a proposition about the present, when the verb co-signifies the present moment, the things signified by all the parts of the assertion must be understood for the final moment.

This conclusion is proved from the preceding one, because according to the Philosopher On Interpretation 2.16a13-18 “‘is’ signifies a certain composition” which one cannot understand without the things composed. Therefore if the copula ‘is’ had joined them for the final moment, then for that moment must the things signified by all the parts be understood.

120. [Seventh conclusion] - And herefrom there is a seventh conclusion for the present purpose, that when here the verb [sc. ‘is’] signifies not time but a moment, because the first union of the terms is done by infinite virtue and consequently in a moment, it follows that all the parts of the assertion and the things they signify must be understood for the final moment.

121. [Eighth conclusion] - From this follows an eighth conclusion, that the pronoun ‘this’ will hold for the moment of the complete utterance; and then it would be said to be demonstrative of that which for that moment is under the species, so that in this way the demonstrating is partly for the senses and partly for the intellect, and to this extent it is altogether simply so, as the first opinion said [n.100]. But that which is demonstrated for the intellect and directly is not demonstrated disjunctively, but what is now contained [under the species] is demonstrated etc.

122. [Ninth conclusion] - The ninth conclusion is that in the case of singulars the order follows the order of universals. For any universal can be understood to descend to its proper singular before it is contracted through some difference to some lower level of predication, as to the species, and so we have the following order of singulars: ‘this being’ ‘this substance’ ‘this body’ and so successively to ‘Socrates’.

123. This is plain from Avicenna in his Physics, Sufficientia 1.1, because from a distance we first see a body before we see an animal, and an animal before we see a man [cf. Ord. I d.3 n.84], which is not to be understood of universals (for sight does not see universals), but of singulars of something more universal.That is, we do not see the universal ‘body’ before we see the individual Socrates, but we see this body, this animal, this man, Socrates. ²

124. [Tenth conclusion] - And then there is a tenth conclusion, that ‘this’ in a proposition points to a singular being and not per se to a singular of some class more or less universal than being.

125. The proof:

First, because one reasonably asks about many things ‘what is this?’, but the supposit and that which is asked about are not the same thing; therefore if the ‘this’ stands for ‘this wood’ or ‘this stone’, because that is what is being asked about, it follows that the same thing that supposits is being asked about; for when the response is given, namely ‘wood’ or ‘stone’, the mind of the asker is brought to rest about that singular. So what supposits here for the singular is only that it is a singular being, and the question asked is about something specific under being, and anything specific under being is appropriate as a response. And this proof rests on a single word that is put in Exodus 16.15 about manna, that is, ‘what is this?’

126. Another proof is a sort of grammatical one, that an adjective, when in a substantive of neuter gender, includes the substantive in itself according to the grammarians; but it only includes that which is something or a being;     therefore etc     .

127. [Eleventh conclusion] - The eleventh conclusion, that although the ‘this’ here only per se stands for a singular being, yet it is understood for a singular of some lower predication and regularly for the singular that is ‘the body of Christ’; because the singular is only there in that which is the body of Christ, and only in the last moment for which being in some singular thing is demonstrative.

128. [Twelfth conclusion] - The twelfth conclusion is that not for this reason will the sense of the proposition be ‘my body is my body’, because the understanding of the antecedent [‘this’] is one thing and the understanding of the consequent [‘my body’] another, even though the subject of the consequent is standing for the subject of the antecedent.

129. The fact is plain because the concept of the consequent can be certain and of the antecedent doubtful; and to be certain and doubtful are not the same.

130. It is also plain by converting the proposition, because the sense of ‘my body is this’, that is, ‘.. .is this being’ is different from the proposition ‘my body is my body’.

131. [Thirteenth conclusion] - The thirteenth conclusion is that, according to this understanding, the proposition [‘this is my body’] can effect or convert [sc. the bread]. For the minister who is principally bringing it about that, in the moment for which he enunciates the proposition, this assertion then signifies, would himself principally convert it, for ‘to bring principally about that this being is the body of Christ’ is really to bring about a conversion through which the body of Christ receives ‘being this’ (for the bringing about by which this being becomes the body of Christ and by which the body of Christ becomes this being, that is, becomes this being which is under these species, is the same bringing about). But the assertion which acts by way of signifying must be conversive [of the bread] for the moment for which the one converting really acts. Therefore this assertion is effective simply.

4. Weighing of the Aforesaid Conclusions

132. From these thirteen conclusions it is plain how this assertion [‘this is my body’] is true because, according to the conclusions, the whole understanding of it, both of the proposition and of the terms, is taken for the final moment of the utterance; and for that moment it points to the same thing that then exists under the accidents. Now it is true that this is the body of Christ and that the proposition does not, on account of ‘this’, get converted into ‘my body is my body’. But the proposition ‘this is my body’ can be a converting proposition, though the other is not, because it denotes a singular of a more universal kind, namely this being that is predicated, but the other denotes that it is specifically said of itself. But a proposition which denotes that some primary predicate is said of ‘this being’ can be effective, just as can the proposition that would denote of a stone that it is first ‘this being’.

133. All these conclusions I can concede, apart from the fifth (and the others insofar as they follow from it), for the verb, when uttered, co-signifies then just as it signifies then; and unless some determination is added whereby the co-signified time would be referred to a different present moment, it does not seem from the force of the utterance that it would join the terms for any moment save for the final moment of uttering the present tense verb.

134. Nor is the proof that is put there [n.116] compelling; for although the understanding of the whole utterance is only brought about by the utterance in the final moment, as was expounded in the first conclusion [nn.104-106], yet a conception of the union of the terms only comes to be for that moment, as is plain from the second conclusion.

135. This is also plain in the case of propositions about the past and future, where a verb can unite a proposition for any past or future moment, however distant from the speaker. And yet the understanding there of the whole assertion is not got save in the moment of the completed utterance, just as neither is the understanding of a proposition about the present so got, nor universally the understanding of any proposition.

136. Through this too can be destroyed what follows on the fifth conclusion, about the demonstrative force of the pronoun ‘this’, for if it must be understood for the time or moment for which there is a combining of terms, and if the combining of terms is not understood for the final moment of the whole utterance but for the moment of the utterance of the verb ‘is’, then it follows that the demonstrative force is understood for the same thing.

137. There is also another difficulty against the aforesaid, specifically about demonstrative force [n.121]; for a demonstrative pronoun, when uttered, signifies what it is demonstrative of; therefore it signifies what can then be pointed to. But there is nothing then able to be pointed to there for the senses save the accidents, nor pointed to for the intellect, as it seems, save what is under the accidents.

One can therefore say a little differently that one does not get from the force of the speaking that the concept of a proposition about the past, or the union of the terms, is understood precisely for the final moment of the whole assertion; but if it is understood to be for a moment it should be understood for the moment of the complete utterance of the verb. The parts too signify when uttered, and if the nature of their signification is such as only to be extended to something that is present when the parts signify, then it is necessary that what they signify is present when the parts are uttered.

138. However it is very possible for someone to determine himself to express some propositional concept for a moment, and possible for the concepts of all the parts of that concept to be taken for that same final moment of utterance; for it is in this way that disputants determine themselves to state their meaning in their responses and to do so for the same moment; otherwise the respondent could never be refuted however much he might accept contradictories. And if indeed he wished to express his concept to another by an assertion about the present, he will not cause a concept in that other for the final moment of utterance by virtue of his words; but it is possible that he express to him for some reason what for that moment he is uttering. And then for such reason, not by virtue of his words, he will conceive the union of the terms for that moment. But if he himself, when speaking, were to intend to cause something by his proposition, then just as he could also intend to express a concept for the final moment, so he could intend to cause the effect for that moment. If too, on the uttering of the assertion, which intends some concept and all its parts to be taken for some moment, someone else, seeing the intention, wanted to cause something, he could cause it for the final moment for which he intends to signify all those things

139. And in this way, although what was said before in the fifth conclusion and the following ones about the final moment of utterance [nn.116, 118-121, 127, 132] is not manifest by virtue of the words, yet it is manifest that they can be understood as far as concerns the intention of him who expresses them, both in himself and as he is a minister of God who, seeing the minister’s intention, can assist with the assertion so as to act in the same way as the assertion itself signifies according to the intention of the speaker of it.

140. Whether this way is held to, that by virtue of the words the whole assertion must be referred to the final moment of the words or the utterance [n.139], or this other, that it is not by virtue of the words but by the determination of the utterer (and this not only in himself but in his ordering to the principal agent who assists the action [nn.138-139]), and if there is preserved in the one way or the other the fact that the proposition is true according to the eighth conclusion and the others that follow it, with which I do not disagree - yet there remains the difficulty common to both ways as to how the proposition [‘this is my body’] is true. For according to both ways, although the proposition is true for the final moment, yet not naturally before the conversion is complete; because the thing naturally ought to be before the assertion is true, “for by the fact the thing is or is not, the assertion is true or false,” Categories 5.4b9-10. The truth, then, does not naturally precede the conversion but follows it; and, as a result, the proposition, as it is true, is not such as to do the converting.

5. Scotus’ own Conclusion

141. For this reason I say that this whole disputation (in thirteen conclusions and their proofs and disproofs) about saving the truth of this proposition [‘this is my body’] is subtle and matter for logic. But for a theologian it suffices that the assertion, as it is a sensible sign, is an instrument of God, instituted by God, for the consecration that follows in the final instant, such that God assists in it as it is a certain preceding effective disposition, so that, when it is complete, he may cause the relevant invisible effect. But the assertion’s truth, as it is such a disposition, does not precede the action of God, because, being a perceptible sign in a state of becoming and consequently in time, it is not understood to have its own truth. Also, when it does have truth, its truth follows, in the order of nature, the divine action.

142. Briefly, then, the theologian should say that, however a logician might save the truth of the proposition, yet the proposition is not a sacramental pronouncement as it is true, but as it is the sort of perceptible sign it is, preceding its truth perhaps in time -and at least naturally - , just as a disposition continuous in time precedes the final moment and the condition in the final moment of whatever it precedes; a cause too precedes the condition of the caused.

143. And if you ask ‘what sort of proposition, either as true or false, is this proposition that converts [the bread]?’, I say that it is neither one way nor the other but only as it is a neutral proposition and prior naturally (and perhaps in time) to its truth.

144. And this priority is proved as follows, that any foundation is prior to the accident that is a relation; a proposition or concept is a foundation in respect of truth, which is an accident that is a relation, because truth can be in or not in a proposition, just as a proposition can conform or not conform with the thing. For when Socrates is sitting the assertion that says ‘Socrates is sitting’ is true, as is said in Categories 5.4a10-b18. Therefore the concept of an assertion as it is in itself is naturally prior to its truth - and the assertion itself too, as it is variable and in a state of becoming, is still prior in duration to its concept (just as time is prior to its ending final moment).

145. And this fact too about the natural priority of the concept to the truth is manifestly plain in a learner; for first a student conceives the undemonstrated conclusion, and indeed as then neither true nor false, and yet he perceives and conceives the whole per se concept of it; second, when a demonstration is applied to it, he conceives it as true. And it is plainly evident that God could institute some un-meaning sentence upon whose utterance by a minister he would assist at the end of the uttering in causing an effect.

146. So, therefore, however it may be with the logical disputation about how the proposition [‘this is my body’] is true [n.141], this point is to be held as certain, that the proposition, as a vocal sign and in external coming to be, is an efficacious sign in respect of consecration, because it is a preceding disposition that God, by compact, assists with at the end in effective causing of an effect [cf. IV d.1 nn.308, 315, 325, d.4 n.103] -regardless of whether the proposition signifies this sort of effect (which is true and fitting in the matter at hand), and that merely so, namely as neither true nor false but insofar as it is a disposition; or whether it signifies the effect as a true proposition does, and that for the time when it is a disposition or for the moment for which what it is a disposition for will be caused, and then as naturally prior or as naturally posterior to the moment in which the effect will be caused.

147. But one could in a different way make a subtle distinction here, that in the final moment of utterance there is first, according to the order of nature, a concept of the proposition as neither [sc. true or false]; that second a divine operation follows on it, causing what the assertion designates; that third the truth of this conception follows. And so not only is the assertion prior to truth as it is vocally and continuously uttered, but also as it has its proper effect, though not as something true.

148. However this subtlety implies things that belong to the logical disputation about the truth of the proposition or of the conception of the proposition, namely that it is true for the final moment [n.140]; and the subtlety does nothing for the assertion as it is something sacramental. For the conception that is posited as being got through the assertion in the final moment [n.116] is in no way an instrument of God for the action of God that is posited as following in the second moment of nature [n.147], because God does not use for his operation anything sacramental save the perceptible sign [IV d.1 n.315].

149. So in brief, therefore, it suffices for the minister, without his engaging then in dispute about what the assertion is understood for, to intend to pronounce the words in the way that Christ instituted that they be pronounced. And in this way the due intention and the due instrument are got, namely the spoken assertion itself, which instrument, applied by such agent [sc. the minister], God assists so as to cause such effect in the final moment.

150. From these points the understanding of the form of consecration over the wine is plain, because the logical disputation and theological certitude [sc. about the wine] could be altogether like [sc. the disputation and certitude about the bread].

151. But that the words ‘this chalice’ are here set down is because the blood is consecrated under the idea of drink; and a liquid does not have the idea of drink save in a vessel. But nothing of the sort is set down in the idea and consecration of the body, because the body is confected as food, and a solid has the idea of food even though it is not in a vessel.

II. To the Initial Arguments

152. As to the first argument [n.53], it is plain that the ‘this’ is a singular demonstrative of being, and not the bread or its accidents; for it is demonstrative for the moment of the complete uttering of the assertion, and that either by virtue of the words, according to the fifth and seventh conclusions [nn.116, 120], or by the intention of the speaker, according to another way [nn.139-140]. Nor is this the same as saying ‘my body is my body’, as is plain from the thirteenth conclusion [n.131]. And the fact is plain because the proposition ‘this is fire’ could be such as to convert, but not the proposition ‘fire is fire’, because what ‘this being is fire’ does is to make a certain conversion, but not so ‘fire is fire’.

153. As to the second [n.54], it is plain that the ‘for’ is put there to produce continuity in the words, so that the individual words could not there be uttered at once as distinct.

154. As to the third [n.55], I concede that it ought to be that the ‘my’, by virtue of the words, be denoted as referring to the person of Christ; but this is not the case unless mention is made first of Christ, in whose person the words are uttered; just as, if I were to say “Christ said, ‘my doctrine is not mine’,” the signification, from the truth of the proposition, would be that the ‘mine’ is referred to Christ; but not so if, without speaking previously about Christ, someone were at once to say, ‘my doctrine is not mine’.

155. As to the two arguments against the consecration of the blood [nn.56-57], the answer is plain in the body of the question [nn.72-95].